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ABSTRACT
Elections are essential for delivering democratic rule, in which ultimate power should reside in the citizens
of a state. This introduction argues that the management and contestation of elections have now entered a
qualitative new historical period because of the combined development of new technology and broader so-
ciological developments. The era of cyber-elections is marked by: (a) the new ontological existence of the
digital, (b) new flows of data and communication, (c) the rapid acceleration of pace in communications, (d)
the commodification of electoral data, and (e) an expansion of actors involved in elections. These provide
opportunities for state actors to incorporate technology into the electoral process to make democratic goals
more realizable. But it also poses major threats to the running of elections as the activities of actors and
potential mismanagement of the electoral process could undermine democratic ideals such as political
equality and popular control of government. The article argues that this new era therefore requires proactive
interventions into electoral law and the rewriting of international standards to keep pace with societal and
technological change.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of new technologies in elections hasemerged as a key issue in recent years, with con-
cerns about database hacking, media manipulation,
and foreign technological interference leading to
public concern and debate around the world. Recent
examples make the relevance of this issue clear.
The U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee found evi-
dence of Russian interference and media manipula-
tion in the 2016 American presidential election
(United States Senate Intelligence Committee
2019a, 2019b). Estonia’s widely respected identity
card system, which is used for I-voting in elections
and access to government services, was recently
found to be susceptible to identity theft (BBC News
2017). Meanwhile, social media has opened up a
new domain of political interactions, as illustrated
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by claims of bots trying to influence the 2016 Brexit
referendum (House of Commons Digital, Culture,
Media, and Sport Committee 2019; Public Adminis-
tration and Constitutional Affairs Committee 2017).
While technology has been used in elections for
decades in the form of electronic voting machines
and digital registration databases, the explosion of
new technologies and increasing access to these
technologies by citizens and election administrators
demands further academic consideration. This spe-
cial issue considers the question: What are the im-
pacts of new technologies on electoral integrity?
This introduction argues that elections are an es-
sential component in the delivery of democratic
rule, which requires ultimate power residing in the
citizens of a state. The management and contestation
of elections have now entered a qualitatively new his-
torical period because of the combined development
of new technology and broader sociological develop-
ments. The era of cyber-elections is marked by (a)
the new ontological existence of the digital, (b)
new flows of data and communication, (c) the rapid
acceleration of pace in communications, (d) the com-
modification of electoral data, and (e) an expansion
of actors involved in elections. These provide oppor-
tunities for state actors to incorporate technology into
the electoral process to make democratic goals more
realizable. But it also poses major threats to the run-
ning of elections as the activities of actors and poten-
tial mismanagement of the electoral process could
undermine democratic ideals such as political equal-
ity and popular control of government. This article
argues that these new technological realities of run-
ning elections require proactive interventions into
electoral law and the rewriting of international stan-
dards to maintain democratic integrity.
This introduction proceeds as follows. Firstly, it
considers how technology has become integrated
into democratic life, throughout the electoral cycle.
Next, it asks: How are elections in this new techno-
logical environment different? It then proceeds to
suggest a means of evaluating electoral integrity
through democratic theory, and finally applies these
ideals to elections in a new digital environment.
The final section concludes with an overview of the
special issue to come, policy implications, and
other research directions that remain to be addressed.
Based on the arguments in this article and those
which follow in the special issue, this introduction
calls for a major reconsideration of electoral law in
many polities and at the international level.
HOW HAS TECHNOLOGY BECOME
INTEGRATED INTO THE
ELECTORAL CYCLE?
The use of technology in elections is not necessarily
new. From the advent of radio and television for cam-
paign advertising to the adoption of computer-based
technologies in local election offices, there has been a
slow advance of the integration of technology into the
management of elections. In recent years though, it
would seem like this growth of technology in elections
has exploded. Electronic voting and Internet voting
often first come to mind when we think about new tech-
nology in elections, but in fact, technologies have been
adopted at all stages of the management and contesta-
tion of elections, by a variety of different actors. The
electoral cycle approach, used here, emphasizes that
elections are events which take place on a single day.1
Before an election is even called, preparations are
taking place: electoral laws are passed and imple-
mented, voters are registered, and electoral manage-
ment bodies (EMBs) are planning for the upcoming
contest. Technology is used throughout these processes,
from the simplest computer databases used to organize
potential polling stations and poll workers to more com-
plex outward-facing systems for voter registration. In
fact, a variety of new technologies have been imple-
mented in attempts to improve the voter registration
system for both voters and electoral management bod-
ies. This has included innovations such as biometric
registration, where biometric data such as fingerprints
are collected as part of the registration and identifica-
tion process for voters (Piccolino 2016) and online reg-
istration systems which move the registration process to
an online platform to be used by voters remotely (Bar-
reto et al. 2010; Garnett 2019a). There might be com-
plex systems of automation used to add names to the
electoral register from other government data sources.
Moving into the campaign period, new technolo-
gies, particularly the Internet and social media, have
brought new forms of campaigning and with that,
new challenges. Voters’ preferences and activities
online can be captured and used for direct targeting
and advertising by political parties, candidates, or
third-party interest groups. In modern elections, firms
collect information onvoters’ online activities and pref-
erences, and then are hired by campaigns to use these
1For more about the electoral cycle, see <https://aceproject.org/
electoral-advice/electoral-assistance/electoral-cycle>.
2 GARNETT AND JAMES
data to build targeted advertisements (Persily 2017).
The Cambridge Analytica scandal, for example, high-
lighted to the world the common practice of using vot-
ers’ data, often collected elsewhere, for campaigning
purposes. This issue as it pertains to electoral cam-
paigning and voter behavior is covered in other
works (Bodo´, Helberger, and de Vreese 2017), but
this special issue is most concerned with the legal
and administrative responses to these new challenges
in political campaigning. Election management bodies,
courts, and policymakers have had to consider the ap-
propriate uses of these data and privacy issues relating
to them, including how they relate to the regulation of
campaign media and finance.
The final stages of the electoral cycle are election
day and its aftermath. Here we are concerned with
the process of votes being cast and counted, as well
as whether these results are respected. It is first impor-
tant to note that in many countries voting takes place
over a series of days, either with rolling election
dates (as is the case in India’s elections) or with ad-
vance voting opportunities via postal or in-person
early voting. But whether voting is taking place on
one day, or over a series of days, online or in-person,
the use of technology in the casting and counting of
ballots is perhaps one of the oldest lines of inquiry re-
garding the use of technology in elections. Here, we
tend to delineate between e-voting, which includes
the use of technology at the ballot box, such as
DREs (direct-recording electronic voting), where a
computerized device is used for both the casting and
counting of the ballot, or optical scanning machines,
where thevote is cast on paper but counted with the as-
sistance of technology; or I-voting, which involves the
use of personal technology, far from any polling sta-
tion, as in the case of online voting (MIT Election
Data + Science Lab, n.d.). Each of these opportunities
for casting and counting ballots with the assistance of
technology has received some attention, as it relates to
their ability to promote (or detract from) secure, accu-
rate, accessible, and trusted elections.
THE CYBER ELECTIONS ERA: HOW
CYBER ELECTIONS ARE DIFFERENT
A number of sociologists have argued that we
have entered new eras of human civilization be-
cause of profound technological or other societal
changes. This could be the era of the network soci-
ety, the knowledge economy, the post-capitalist age,
an accelerationist era, or surveillance capitalism
(Castells 1996, 2000; Srnicek and Williams 2015;
Webster 2014; Zuboff 2019). The challenge of run-
ning and contesting elections is not inseparable
from such broader developments. Elsewhere,
James (2014, 146–149) distinguishes between pre-
modern, modern, and post-industrial digital age
eras of elections within the early industrializing
established democracies. New challenges arise for
running elections in each era, and techniques have
therefore had to adapt to avoid institutional drift.
Here, we contend that there are five clear qualita-
tive differences about the elections in the digital era.
We focus only on the impact of technology. These
are not instant transformations because the emer-
gence of the digital has been a long-running devel-
opment and the transformations are also linked to
broader societal processes. They are, however,
worth making clear because they have major impli-
cations for how elections are run. They have broadly
occurred during the post-industrial era for the early
industrializing societies. But what is notable is that
the era of cyber elections is a global phenomenon
that has caused disruptions and opportunities across
all societies at very different levels of economic and
democratic development because of the simulta-
neous availability of these technologies (Cruz-
Jesus, Oliveira, and Bacao 2018; Norris 2002).
The era of cyber elections is marked by five core
characteristics. First, cyber elections are marked by
the new ontological existence of the digital. Organ-
izing elections has always involved the flow and
storage of information by electoral management
bodies, campaigners, and government agencies.
Even the earliest of elections in Athenian times
would have involved the storage of electoral regis-
ters and vote tabulations. However, advances in
computational power have rapidly expanded the ca-
pability to increase the volume of this information,
and the nature of the data has changed. This poses
major opportunities for electoral authorities, but
also poses challenges in the management and regu-
lation of data. Three forms of data can be identified:
1. Data held by EMBs. This may have initially
been limited to paper copies of names on elec-
toral registers, structured by geographical dis-
trict. The advent of computer systems gradually
allowed the development of centralized digital
registers with more detailed information on citi-
zens. An increase in computational power and
CYBER ELECTIONS IN THE DIGITAL AGE 3
connections allows the information to be more
easily combined with other governmental data-
sets.
2. Voter personality data. This includes data held
externally about voters by firms such as Goo-
gle, social media companies, and credit refer-
ence agencies about citizens, including
political preferences and consumer preferences,
which can be helpful for parties wanting to
micro-target voters (Moore 2018). Zuboff
(2019) charts the extensive capturing of data
about our behavior from our use of technolo-
gies ranging from search engines to mobile
phones to household appliances. This can then
be used to extrapolate personality and political
inclination.
3. Campaign information. There is new data on
social media—the content and metadata of
posts and articles about the election—which
was previously not available and may therefore
need regulation. Chadwick (2017) describes the
development of hybrid media systems which
helpfully describes the transformation in the
campaign environment where physical cam-
paigning activity continues, but it is accompa-
nied by the digital.
Second, the era of cyber elections is marked by
new information flows of data.2 For example,
whereas electoral registers were once stored in
rusty filing cabinets, which could only be accessed
by those who were physically present and able to ac-
cess the key, they can now be accessed around the
world by those with both legitimate and illegitimate
reasons for accessing them. This might include
other government departments looking to undertake
socio-demographic censuses of the population or to
undertake immigration or social security checks of
citizens. It might also include overseas actors seek-
ing to access, manipulate, or sabotage key electoral
infrastructure.
Third, the era of cyber elections is marked by the
speed of communications and data exchanges. The
digital availability of information and advances in
telecommunications infrastructures means that
many aspects of the electoral process can occur at
a higher speed. Voter registration applications are
not dependent on the postal system, but can be sub-
mitted live online. Campaign information can be
sent immediately with a tweet. Attacks on election
infrastructure can be launched simultaneously in
multiple locations through a cyber-attack. This
new speed is a major development which has been
long commented on by sociologists (Castells
1996). The new speed of information transfer
opens opportunities for EMBs to provide more effi-
cient services, but may also require immediate ac-
tion if false or misleading information is spread.
Fourth, there has been the increased commodifi-
cation of electoral data. Data relating to elections
have always had an instrumental importance for
those responsible for running elections, and for par-
ties and candidates. However, data such as the elec-
toral register and political preferences of voters
have taken on a new monetary value. The electoral
register is often used for purposes beyond running
elections such as enabling the credit reference
checking of citizens. Multinational companies
therefore purchase localized registers to create
new centralized datasets, which are then used to
generate profit (James and Bernal 2020, 24–27).
More famously, companies such as Cambridge Ana-
lytica have harvested personal information from
millions of users in order to advise campaigning
teams for monetary gain (Cadwalladr and Graham-
Harrison 2018). Zuboff (2019) describes this as a
key part of the move to surveillance capitalism.
Fifth, cyber elections are marked by an expan-
sion in the range of actors involved in electoral gov-
ernance who may also embark on new tactics and
strategies to achieve their objectives. Elections
take place in a ‘‘constellation of actors involved in
steering and delivering elections, including the
micro anthropological practices, beliefs and power
relationships between them’’ (James 2020, 270).
These might traditionally involve EMBs that are re-
sponsible for organizing the election, the govern-
ments and legislatures/legislators who set the rules
for how elections are run, and the political parties
and candidates who are seeking to run in the elec-
tion. They also include media outlets that play a cru-
cial role in disseminating information to citizens
about the electoral process, democracy, and the par-
ties and candidates. Civil society groups can help
boost voter turnout through registration campaigns
or providing political support for candidates.
The move towards cyber elections in a digital age
can have different implications for each set of ac-
tors. For EMBs, technology presents new means
2We are grateful to Alex Williams for this point.
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with which to deliver elections that could improve
the citizens’ experience or make back-office pro-
cesses more economically efficient. For parties
and candidates, they provide new opportunities to
campaign. The digital domain is a new area through
which information can be spread that might not be
regulated in the same way as other aspects of the
electoral process. There are opportunities for new
media outlets to emerge with different business
models. Civil society groups can quickly mobilize
citizens through social media channels.
But at the same time new actors come into the elec-
toral scene. Social media companies have new powers
to shape the information that citizens see, develop be-
havioral nudges, and set policies that could shape elec-
tions worldwide. The volume of ‘‘media outlets’’ has
expanded with anyone worldwide able to set up a web-
site and create content about an election. External state
actors are also suddenly able to orchestrate misinfor-
mation campaigns or propaganda in support of candi-
dates or parties worldwide with ease, because it does
not require the physical deployment of personnel or in-
formation to a polity. The range of suppliers of equip-
ment also expands as companies worldwide seek to
gain new market shares of the technology used in elec-
toral management, from databases to electronic voting
machines, albeit partly as a result of globalized and
deregulated information and communication technol-
ogies (ICT) markets and shifts by governments to use
new public management policies. There are also new
entrepreneurial private sector companies seeking to
extract profit from electoral data.
HOW CAN WE EVALUATE ELECTORAL
INTEGRITY IN THIS CONTEXT?
The new era can lead to major shifts in power as
actors have new strategies and tactics available to
them. In order to evaluate the impact of the new
age of cyber elections on electoral integrity, it is
first necessary to better define the principles of elec-
toral integrity, drawing first on democratic theory.3
At their core, elections must be considered in
terms of their role in delivering democracy as a po-
litical system. Democracy is simplistically thought
of as ‘‘rule by the people.’’ It can therefore be juxta-
posed with other ‘‘-cracies’’ such as autocracies,
plutocracies, and stratocracies, in which the power
resides with the landed nobility, wealthy, or mili-
tary. Democracy is therefore the political system
which many countries reached following historical
struggles against aristocratic elites, rich landowners,
or authoritarian leaders. This power is, of course,
exercised through representatives on their behalf,
with elections providing the mechanism for the se-
lection of those representatives.4
A parallel development in the process of democ-
ratization was the development of the state system.
‘‘The people,’’ in the post-Westphalian era, are those
identified as citizens within nationally bounded,
hermetically sealed polities (Axtmann 2004).
There are sometimes voting rights for citizens living
overseas, or resident citizens of other nationalities.
But in this regard, there should therefore be no in-
fluence for external governments, companies, and
citizens.
There have been attempts to define democracy in
more detail. Robert Dahl famously provided a min-
imalist concept of it as ‘‘the continuing responsive-
ness of the government to the preferences of its
citizens, considered as political equals’’ (Dahl
1971, 2). David Beetham (1994), meanwhile, saw
democracy as the fulfillment of key principles in-
cluding the realization of political equality and pop-
ular control of government. In all definitions,
however, elections remain the crucial instrument
for achieving democracy. They are not the only in-
strument. Others such as open and accountable gov-
ernment and civil and political rights are all also
required. Nonetheless, elections enable the peaceful
transition of power and enable citizens to gain dem-
ocratic representation and to hold governments to
account. We argue that there are three principles
that are necessary for democracy; all three could
be affected by the deployment of technology.
One is the importance of opportunities for delib-
eration. Citizens need, as Dahl put it, full opportu-
nities to formulate their preferences (Dahl 1971,
2–3). This means freedom to form and join organi-
zations, freedom of expression, the right to vote, the
right to compete for public office, and alternative
forms of information. Less minimalist approaches
require active deliberation of information and issues
3For a discussion of alternative conceptualizations see Norris
(2014, 21–39) and of electoral management quality see James
(2020, 33–86).
4There are also many variants of democracy such as liberal de-
mocracy, social democracy, consociationalist and majoritarian
democracy, which all present different demands on elections.
They all have elections as an essential component, however.
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by citizens (Fleuß and Helbig 2020). Simply hold-
ing elections is insufficient since there is no guaran-
tee that citizens will actively consider their interests
and the issues—or that they will vote. There is
therefore the risk that elections could be taking
place within a ‘‘zombie democracy’’ of apathy and
disengagement (Koch 2017).
A second principle that should underpin elections
is equality of participation. Political equality is cen-
tral to the practice of elections. Historically, polities
are deep in social and economic equality, but there
should be political equality. Any given polity
might have economic inequality, but there should
be political equality between citizens. One major
threat to this equality has been the turnout gap, in
which there are differential levels of participation
by groups, whether by age, ethnicity, educational
level, socioeconomic status, or otherwise. The pro-
posed solution to this is the use of inclusive voting
practices which seek to redress this turnout inequal-
ity and other forms of inequality in the electoral pro-
cess (James and Garnett 2020). Technology, here,
could be a game changer in providing new opportu-
nities and threats to meet this principle, and what
constitutes an inclusive voting practice.
A third principle is robust electoral management
quality. Electoral laws can be designed in ways
which support and strengthen democracy, but like
all public policies, they require successful imple-
mentation on the ground. The PROSeS framework
sets out a range of principles which are important
for realizing broader democratic goals (James
2020). The service that is provided to the voter
and that she should expect is not unlike that of
schools or hospitals. Convenience, quality of ser-
vice, transparency, professionalism, probity, cost ef-
fectiveness, and citizen and stakeholder satisfaction
are all hallmarks of good equality election delivery,
just as they are for other public services. These are
important principles in their own right, but can also
have instrumental effects. Long queues at polling
stations, for example, can undermine voter confi-
dence in the electoral process (King 2019). We
know that public confidence in elections is crucial
for democratic legitimacy (Lipset 1960; Norris
2014). If citizens believe that their votes have cre-
ated the government, they will be more likely to per-
ceive it as legitimate. However, if citizens believe
that an election was manipulated, they will have
less reason to see it as legitimate. The consequences
of a loss in democratic legitimacy can range from
protests and civil disobedience, to violent conflicts
or the election of anti-establishment populist lead-
ers, and even the collapse of democracy (Norris
2014). As such, any implications of technology
for the management of elections, including how
this management is perceived, is crucial.
These three principles are not necessarily ex-
haustive but do present some essential elements of
electoral integrity to ensure democratic rule. Impor-
tantly, they are all dependent on electoral law. Elec-
tion law is a crucial consideration in delivering
these key principles because it specifies the rules
of the game, regulates proper roles, and structures
power relations within systems of electoral gover-
nance. At the international level, international
legal and nonbinding agreements are important be-
cause they can norm-set the appropriate behavior of
actors (Hyde 2011). For example, the United
Nations International Covenant for Civil and Polit-
ical Rights (1966) states that all citizens have the
right ‘‘to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic
elections which shall be by universal and equal suf-
frage and shall be held by secret ballot, guarantee-
ing the free expression of the will of the
electors.’’5 Rapid developments, however, including
the introduction and increase of digital technology,
require that electoral law and practices be changed
so that electoral integrity can be achieved in this
new environment. This may involve changing or
updating laws and regulatory regimes within na-
tional polities, but also a reconsideration of whether
the international standards that were defined as
‘‘best practice’’ for elections are fit for purpose or
in need of revision themselves, if we want to realize
democratic objectives. For this reason, those inter-
national ‘‘best practices’’ cannot provide an anchor-
ing definition of electoral integrity since they need
to respond to changed circumstances.
5Article 25, Section B of the United Nations International Cove-
nant for Civil and Political Rights (1966) (<http://www
.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx>). See also
an earlier document, the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (1948) (<http://www.un.org/en/universal-
declaration-human-rights/>). Other examples include United
Nations Convention on the Political Rights of Women (1952)
(<http://www.un.org/womenwatch/directory/convention_political_
rights_of_women_10741.htm>); Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe Copenhagen Document (1990) (<http://
www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304>); and Inter-Parliamentary
Union Declaration on Criteria for Free and Fair Elections
(1994) (<http://www.ipu.org/cnl-e/154-free.htm>).
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HOW ARE THESE IDEALS ACHIEVED
OR THWARTED IN A NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT?
We therefore ask: How can these democratic ideals
of electoral integrity be achieved or prevented in a
new technological environment? What new strategies
or tactics are available to actors? What responses and
changes in laws, practices, and agreements may be
necessary to respond to this new environment? The
articles in this special issue explore these questions,
tackling a variety of technologies, geographic cases,
and stages of the electoral cycle. To begin this conver-
sation, however, we consider the three major princi-
ples of electoral integrity mentioned above—the
opportunity for public deliberation, the equality of
participation, and finally, the professionalism and
impartiality of the delivery of elections as a public
service—and how they may be helped or hindered
through the use of technology in elections.
Deliberative opportunities
In order for elections to be robust public exercises
of deliberation and decision, the debates and discus-
sion must allow for widespread participation, and the
provision of adequate information for citizens to
make a decision and get to the polls. How have
new technologies in the digital age impacted the in-
tegrity of this public deliberation and discourse?
It is not surprising that technology, especially in
the form of social media, may help broaden avenues
for deliberation, with new means of debating and
discussing ideas and gaining political knowledge.
The Internet, let loose, allows the immediate and
freer exchange of information that can facilitate de-
liberation. However, there are also particular chal-
lenges that have been brought to light in recent
years. One challenge regarding the use of social
media to advertise issues and candidates during
elections is the inequality of information. With di-
rect targeting on social media in particular, candi-
dates and campaigns can tailor their messages to
specific groups of voters, down to very specific var-
iables. While this may be effective for candidates, it
can also contribute to the creation of an ‘‘echo
chamber,’’ where voters only hear the sorts of mes-
sages that campaigners think they will be receptive
to (Barbera´ et al. 2015). This can contribute to po-
larization of the electorate and national politics
(Baum and Groeling 2008; Gruzd and Roy 2014).
Additionally, this may lead to some new forms
of inequality in the campaign since different voters
are hearing different messages. This may inhibit the
ability of all voters to consider the same messages
and issues when deciding whom they will vote for.
This is challenging especially in larger or more di-
verse countries, since issues that unite the country
may not be considered in election campaigns.
Relating to the types of messages that voters are
likely to hear during a campaign, we now turn to
perhaps the most well-known issue regarding the
cyber-threats to elections: namely, the threat of dis-
information, or the deliberate dissemination of in-
correct information to sway public opinion and/or
political behavior, a phenomenon observed in many
regions of the world (Bradshaw 2018; Education for
Justice 2019; Funk 2019; Guest Blogger 2019).
Disinformation campaigns can target a variety of
electoral actors. Electoral management bodies fear
disinformation about electoral procedures or results.
This is not a new phenomenon. For example, Cana-
da’s ‘‘robo-calls’’ scandal in the 2011 federal elec-
tion saw voters nefariously misled about their
polling locations via automated telephone calls on
election day (Pal 2017). However, the ability for in-
formation to spread via social media makes this
threat particularly dangerous. If a malicious actor
was able to access an EMB’s website or social
media account, for example, they could easily pro-
vide false information or fake election results. Gha-
na’s 2016 presidential election, for example, faced
both the hacking of their website and misinforma-
tion on the results spread throughout social media,
prompting the EMB to tweet for voters to ignore
the results that were circulating (BBC News 2016).
Likewise, we have seen numerous examples of
the types of information that voters receive about
their candidates being manipulated or falsified and
distributed via online media. Examples include im-
personation of candidates’ social media profiles,
which can then provide false messaging or informa-
tion to voters (Garnett et al. 2019). Another new
challenge is so-called ‘‘deep fakes,’’ or videos or
photos that have been doctored to provide false in-
formation. Even if these types of disinformation
are detected and corrected, the damage may already
have been done in the minds of voters.
Another issue that must be addressed is the po-
tential for harmful speech online, including intimi-
dation, violence, and threats, that are less easy to
trace and protect from (Brown 2017). This may
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influence who is willing to participate in politics, if
past social media usage, or future threats, are taken
into consideration when deciding to run for office
(Tenove, Tworek, and McKelvey 2018). Some re-
search on the impact of online campaigning, for ex-
ample, has considered its effect on the participation
of women in elections. Bardall (2013) has docu-
mented the rise of violence against women in elec-
tions via new technologies. Bardall (2013) explains
that a woman’s public image may be easily de-
graded, they may be intimidated, or may dispropor-
tionately be the target of direct attacks, silencing, or
media bias. However, she also acknowledges that
new technologies can likewise facilitate the moni-
toring and documentation of violence against
women and be a key tool of female empowerment
when used appropriately.
A further implication of new media is on the bal-
ance of power between candidates and parties com-
peting for office. During the course of the twentieth
century there was a move to tighten the regulation of
election campaigns to restrict the amount of money
that could be spent by candidates and parties (Norris
and van Es 2016). This was partly borne from a con-
cern that those who had the most financial resources
could use these to influence voters and would there-
fore have an unfair advantage at election time. The
era of cyber elections, however, meant that regula-
tions and laws restricting physical campaigning do
not necessarily apply to online campaigning. Finan-
ciers are more readily able to give unrestricted cap-
ital to parties and candidates. Party machines are
able to push new content onto social media plat-
forms and micro-target individual voters (Moore
2018). Social media platforms have new powers
available to them to set algorithms, leading to con-
cerns that there might be an algocracy (Danaher
2016). New forms of inequality in the electoral pro-
cess are therefore opened up because while there
might not be immediate restrictions on deliberation,
the environment in which this deliberation takes
place might be systematically biased towards partic-
ular candidates, thereby undermining the principle
of political equality.
Equality of participation
For democratic ideals to be achieved, all citizens
must be able to vote, and have their vote count
equally. This issue is important even before election
day, as voters are registered and resources are allo-
cated for polling stations. Different technological
means have been tested to improve the quality of
registration lists. These lists are key for voters to
be able to easily vote on election day, and even if
pre-registration is not mandatory, voters who are
registered still benefit from information mailed to
them in advance of the election. Furthermore, elec-
tion administrators will allocate more appropriate
resources to certain areas if they have a better idea
of how many voters live there.
Some of the means that have been used to im-
prove the accessibility and accuracy of voter regis-
tration include biometric technology and online
registration. In some countries, biometric data,
such as a fingerprint, is now used to assist in con-
firming the identity of a voter. This was heralded
as a key step forward in some contexts where reli-
able registries of all voters were not available. The
idea is that it would help ensure the integrity of citi-
zen participation since no voter could register or
vote twice. However, in some cases, the use of
this technology proved disastrous when it was
implemented where adequate electricity and net-
work access were unavailable (Piccolino 2016).
In other countries, rather than changing the basis
of identity verification for voter registration, the
means by which voters could register were changed
in an attempt to make it more convenient for the
voter. This includes the use of electronic voter reg-
istration done in-person and remote online voter
registration systems. The latter has been adopted
by many countries and provides voters the opportu-
nity to register or amend their registration entirely
online (Barreto et al. 2010; Garnett 2019a). It is
thought to improve the accuracy of information
since voters can amend their details when necessary
(such as a change in address), and there are fewer
chances for clerical errors or missing records.
Some research has also suggested it may attract cit-
izens who do not normally vote to register, such as
young people (Garnett 2019a). In this way, the use
of technology may improve the participation levels
of under-represented population groups.
Additionally, in-person voting technology has
assisted in promoting more inclusive voting. Elec-
tronic voting machines, for example, may improve
accessibility, especially for traditionally under-
represented voters, including minorities and those
with disabilities. For example, in one case studied
in Australia, e-voting was piloted as a solution to
language barriers among the indigenous population
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(Hill and Alport 2007). DRE-voting can also come
with additional accessibility features for those
with any number of disabilities, such as audio assis-
tance, magnification for those with low vision, or
adaptability for sip-and-puff devices used by some
quadriplegics, to name just a few (Cross et al.
2009). They can also provide voters with disabilities
the opportunity to independently cast their ballot,
rather than relying on assistance from a poll worker
or other assistant. Online voting may likewise im-
prove accessibility by attracting a different popula-
tion group that may not normally be able to attend a
physical polling station due to any number of phys-
ical or psychological limitations.
However, technologies that may facilitate the par-
ticipation of some groups may, at the same time, de-
crease the likelihood of others participating. Here we
may find some voters beginning to distrust elections
or even refusing to participate as more technology is
adopted. They may see security issues that infringe
upon the privacy of their personal information and
vote. Whether these issues are real or imagined,
they have the same effect of potentially turning
some people off the voting process.
These security issues are commonly discussed in
academic literature and the media. Commentators
and academics alike have warned about the poten-
tial for security breaches, threatening the privacy
of an individual’s vote, or erasing or amending elec-
tion results (Gritzalis 2003). These sets of security
concerns are different for in-person technology
used to cast ballots when compared with online vot-
ing. For the in-person use of technology, such as
DREs, the fear is less about direct hacking, since
the devices are rarely connected to the Internet,
but instead the possibility that the equipment
could be tampered with before the device is
deployed to a polling station. Fears that electronic
counting devices could be tampered with led, for ex-
ample, the Dutch 2017 election ballots to be
counted entirely by hand in a last-minute decision
to ensure security (Chan 2017). Some security
mechanisms, like paper trails and post-election au-
dits, however, have been suggested as means to
combat these security concerns associated with the
use of technology at the ballot box (Burton, Cul-
nane, and Schneider 2016; Dunn and Merkle 2018).
Online voting, of course, comes with another set
of security concerns, since it necessarily involves
the Internet (Hall and Alvarez 2008). This voting
system may therefore be more prone to hacking to
erase or amend results, or invade voters’ privacy.
Voters could also easily be misled by fake informa-
tion about online voting, or false URLs, which, if
followed, would not actually record their ballot, or
could even lead to further cybersecurity breaches.
Similarly, the use of technology in registration and
voting may cause problems that actually prevent
some voters from casting a ballot. For example,
online voting could also easily be disrupted by de-
liberate malicious denial of service attacks, as
well as simply an oversaturation of the website by
legitimate voters. This was, for example, the case
in many Ontario municipalities during the 2018 mu-
nicipal elections, where the online voting website
crashed due to technical glitches and a high volume
of legitimate voters (Britneff 2018; Gollom 2018).
Finally, since online voting is unsupervised, it is
easy to envisage scenarios where a voter may be di-
rectly influenced or intimidated into voting a certain
way, or where their privacy is infringed upon (Essex
2016).
Adding to these issues are studies linking the use
of technology in voting and lower public trust. Some
preliminary evidence has demonstrated that public
trust can be eroded by the use of technology in elec-
tions (Alvarez et al. 2013; Alvarez, Katz, and
Pomares 2011; Delis et al. 2014; Pomares, Levin,
and Alvarez 2014). Voters may distrust the faceless
technology of electronic voting and be concerned
about whether their vote will actually be counted
as intended when swallowed into the ‘‘black box’’
of a voting machine (Alvarez, Hall, and Llewellyn
2008; Garnett and Simpson 2019). For this reason,
Card and Moretti (2007) argue, for example, that
e-voting at the polls may depress turnout if not ac-
companied by education campaigns. Further studies
have considered the relationship between online
voting and turnout, though the results are mixed,
with some studies showing no effect (Germann
and Serdu¨lt 2017) and others suggesting it actually
attracts population groups that are likely to vote
anyway (Bochsler 2009, 2010).
A further threat to equality of participation is
posed by digital voter suppression. Voter suppression
has been a long-standing tactic of many elections.
Opposition voters can be deliberately targeted with
inaccurate information about the location of polling
stations, eligibility requirements, or have their regis-
tration status contested (Piven, Minnite, and Groarke
2009). The era of cyber elections facilitates this sup-
pression through the micro-targeting of particular
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groups. This might include calls to boycott the elec-
tion through tweets or voter intimidation, as identi-
fied in the American case (Mie Kim 2018). For
some scholars, even positive micro-targeting, when
using the Internet to contact and encourage certain
types of voters to go to the polls, puts other voters
at a disadvantage with less information about the
electoral process, thus reducing their turnout (Ross
and Spencer 2019).
Electoral management delivery
Finally, we consider the implications of technol-
ogy for the professional, impartial, and transparent
management of elections. The case of the 2000 elec-
tion in the United States was a landmark example of
a shift towards electronic voting mechanisms when
it became clear that lever and punch-card voting
mechanisms were not necessarily recording the vot-
er’s intention correctly (Card and Moretti 2007). In
this case, electronic voting (DREs) was a solution to
this problem, allowing voters to confirm their selec-
tion. Additionally, DREs were associated with a re-
duced number of residual votes, as the machines
could immediately notify voters of errors, such as
over-voting (Allers and Kooreman 2008; Hammer
et al. 2010). Outside of the American case, elec-
tronic voting has also solved some accuracy issues,
for example, in Kenya, where e-voting was a solu-
tion to an inaccurate voter register and difficulties
transporting votes from polling stations to the loca-
tions where the ballots would be counted (Barkan
2013). Thus, where the security of e-voting is en-
sured, the process may actually allow for more ac-
curate results.
Particularly in new democracies, the use of tech-
nology can help improve perceptions that the vote
count is not being tampered with by electoral offi-
cials, since it provides a level of technological over-
sight and transparency, and is less easily tampered
with. For example, a novel experiment in Uganda
demonstrated that electoral officials who thought
some technology would be used to verify their activ-
ities were more likely to comply with official count
procedures (Callen et al. 2016).
There are also some opportunities associated
with improving accuracy of information collected
by election management bodies with the help of
new technologies. For example, online registration
is suggested to improve the accuracy of registration
data for election management bodies. It may attract
a greater portion of the population, especially pop-
ulation groups that may not have previously been
registered, because it is more accessible (Garnett
2019a). There is also less of a risk of voters making
errors, since electronic registration programs can
automatically detect them. It may also reduce tran-
scription errors (Shaw, Ansolabehere, and Stewart
2015). The use of optical scans or direct-recording
voting machines on election day can likewise help
to address the human error associated with hand-
counted ballots. Furthermore, the advent of digital
technologies can improve the spread of information,
allowing electoral management bodies to contact
voters in new ways to share information about vot-
ing procedures, or provide additional layers of
transparency about electoral results.
The use of digital technologies may also solve
some security challenges associated with protecting
election data. For example, the centralization of
voter registration records in a digital format can pro-
tect against the mishandling of paper files (Shaw,
Ansolabehere, and Stewart 2015). It may also pro-
vide additional opportunities for the back-up of
files, if they are stored via various means, as is the
case for electronic voting machines with paper
trails.
Meanwhile, technology has also provided oppor-
tunities for cost savings. Internet voting has been
found to be the most cost-efficient way of delivering
elections (Krimmer, Duenas-Cid, and Krivonosova
2020). The use of data-mining techniques to auto-
matically reregister citizens which other public
data sources suggest are still resident is thought to
have led to major savings (James and Bernal 2020).
However, there are also several threats associ-
ated with accuracy in the use of technology in elec-
tions, particularly as it pertains to the accuracy of
information that voters are receiving about candi-
dates, parties, electoral events, the voting process,
and even election results. Disinformation or misin-
formation has become a popular field of study in
the social media age, where information can be
disseminated quickly and prolifically without the
traditional gatekeepers of the traditional media
(Marwick and Lewis 2017). Furthermore, more ac-
tors can be involved in sharing potentially false in-
formation, since the Internet does not know the
physical boundaries that once limited the spread
of information.
With new technologies in elections come new se-
curity concerns. Some cybersecurity threats are
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obvious, such as hacking compromising private in-
formation, such as voter registration rolls or election
results. This information can then be sold, ran-
somed, or otherwise compromised (Buchanan and
Sulmeyer 2016; National Academies of Sciences
et al. 2018). This threat brings with it serious ques-
tions about the privacy of voters’ data, but also their
future willingness to provide information to legiti-
mate authorities, if they fear that it may be compro-
mised. For example, online voter registration
systems can sometimes bring with them concerns
about the privacy of data, and may then impact a
voter’s decision of whether to register to vote or
not (Barreto et al. 2010).
In recent years, the distributed denial of service at-
tack, which floods a website or service in order to
render it unusable for legitimate users, has become
a threat to elections (Canadian Communications
Security Establishment 2017; National Academies
of Sciences et al. 2018). There are already examples
of this occurring in electoral contests, including per-
haps the 2016 Brexit referendum, where the voter
registration website crashed, and a targeted distrib-
uted denial of service was not ruled out as a potential
reason why the site was temporarily unavailable
(Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs
Committee 2017).
All of these issues may have implications for
overall trust in electoral management, and electoral
integrity and democracy more broadly, which we
know from previous research are related, especially
in contexts where electoral integrity is fragile (Gar-
nett 2019b). Thus, any implications of the use of
technology for public perceptions of the transpar-
ency and impartiality of electoral management are
key to electoral integrity.
RESPONDING WITH ELECTORAL LAW
What then are the policy consequences of enter-
ing the era of cyber elections? How can election law
respond to these new challenges? Figure 1 summa-
rizes the theoretical framework outlined in this in-
troduction, depicting a conceptualization of how
technological change has impacted elections. In
the left-hand column, the major infrastructural
changes are detailed. Technology, however, does
not directly cause societal change—rather it opens
up new strategies and tactics for actors to undertake.
These strategies might be deployment of new data-
bases of electoral registers, digital (dis)information
campaigns, or other schemes described in this sec-
tion. If adopted, there might be consequences for
the integrity of elections and the realization of dem-
ocratic ideals. The major practical question that fol-
lows, then, is what laws should be adopted to
respond to these challenges? This is a research
agenda that has already begun, but we hope that
this special issue and the articles within it further
reignite that agenda.
In the first section of this special issue, the au-
thors considered comparative lessons and case stud-
ies into the adoption of new technologies into the
electoral process, largely from an electoral manage-
ment perspective. The key take-aways from these
works emphasize the need for further regulation of
the use of technology in elections. Key questions
must be resolved at both the national and subna-
tional levels. The major issue clarified by articles
by Leontine Loeber, as well as Aleksander Essex
and Nicole Goodman, in this issue is that electoral
policies can sometimes be silent on major issues re-
lating to the adoption, ownership, and contingency
planning for electoral technology. Key questions
that we identify include:
1. What technology can be used?
2. Who owns the technology (and resulting data)?
3. What procedures are in place if technology
breaks or is faulty?
Evidence from the Ontario case presented by
Essex and Goodman, as well as discussions regard-
ing contingency planning in the United States by
Mitchell Brown, Kathleen Hale, Robert J. Smith,
and Lindsey Forson in this issue, highlight the
need to think through these potential challenges as
early as possible.
Likewise, the second set of articles calls for
greater consideration of legal apparatuses to detect
actions on new online media that may compromise
democratic ideas, including false statements and
disinformation. The challenge is to identify laws
that can protect democratic space, while also pro-
tecting freedom of speech. Netina Tan’s overview
of various approaches from Southeast Asia in this
issue suggests that further research is needed to un-
cover the most effective means of negotiating this
delicate balance in the legal sphere.
Finally, we argue that international legal frame-
works and the norms and standards that govern
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elections must be adapted to cyber elections. Many
of these frameworks used to commonly evaluate
electoral integrity were adopted before the advent
of new technologies, and the new actors and in-
creasing speed that come with this. Electoral integ-
rity now must include the cyber-sphere, specifically
how it impacts opportunities for deliberation, the
quality of participation, and the professionalism
and transparency of electoral management.
In sum, election law plays a vital role in this both
at the national, subnational, and international level.
It may require the revisiting of international stan-
dards and handbooks. This special issue takes a
major step towards considering these changes in a
comparative light.
THE ISSUE AHEAD
This special issue tackles some of these emerging
issues related to the use of technology in elections by
focusing on two major themes: the use of technolo-
gies in electoral management activities, including
casting and counting ballots, and the use of new me-
dias for campaigning and information dissemination.
First, Loeber considers the supply, management,
and governance of election technology, using new
data from an international survey of electoral man-
agement bodies. It specifically looks at the ownership
and control of a variety of election technologies that
are in use around the globe, considering how this
may impact the independence and impartiality of
electoral management more broadly. Next, Ziaul
Haque and David Carroll also consider the use of
technologies in elections cross-nationally, consider-
ing their direct impact on expert perceptions of elec-
toral integrity in four areas: voter registration, voter
identification, election result processing, and publi-
cation of results.
This is followed by two case studies of the use of
technology in electoral systems. Essex and Good-
man consider online voting in Canadian municipal-
ities, calling for actionable operational, technical,
and legal guidelines for the use of online voting
technologies. Brown et al., on the other hand, look
at whether American election administrators pro-
vide appropriate training, resources, and assistance
in their security planning and operations.
The second set of articles in this special issue
looks more specifically at information and cam-
paigning, starting with two case studies from the
Canadian context. In their article on disinformation
and digital information equality, Elizabeth Judge
and Amir Korhani identify the Canadian legislative
and judicial responses to the challenge of false state-
ments made during elections. Michael Pal follows
with an article on the use of social media, outlining
the various approaches that have been taken to pro-
tect electoral integrity in the online sphere. Finally,
Tan explores the challenges surrounding social
media and disinformation in Southeast Asia. Her ar-
ticle presents a new typology of digital policy formu-
lation and enforcement approaches, and then assesses
their potential impacts on electoral integrity.
The articles in this special issue provide analysis of
both cross-national and country-specific responses to
the opportunities and threats brought by new technol-
ogies into the electoral sphere. Their findings high-
light the diversity of responses to new technologies
from legislatures, courts, and election administrators,
including issues of ownership, implementation, and
regulation. They highlight how these decisions can
FIG. 1. Conceptualizing cyber elections and identifying policy solutions. ICTs, information and communication technologies.
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impact electoral integrity and the quality of democ-
racy more generally, and suggest avenues forward
in the new research field of cyber elections.
Elections are entering a new digital era in which
there are new opportunities and threats for the con-
duct and contestation of elections. Although many
of these are not entirely new—perhaps being a con-
tinuation of older problems there has been a qualita-
tive leap in the nature of the challenges. Having
made this argument, this opening article has set
out some criteria for evaluating the impacts of dig-
ital technology on elections and has begun to trace
what effects it has had. It has focused attention on
what electoral law reform should be required,
within national polities, or worldwide, to address
these problems. Subsequent articles in the special
issue take this agenda forward.
In sum, we argue that elections are essential to
democratic rule. However, our evaluations of elec-
toral integrity require a new focus in the cyber
era, with its expansion of actors, transition, and
challenges in running elections. We argue that inter-
ventions to electoral law and new international stan-
dards are needed to confront these challenges and
safeguard the integrity of elections.
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